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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. OBJECTIVE AND ApPROACH 
To what extent is a person with a disability protected by 
legal remedies against disability-based discrimination? 
This article proposes to explore this compelling question. 
Disability discrimination, a relatively new area of civil rights 
protection, is a concern not only to people with disabilities, who 
are estimated at about 35 million in the United States, but to a 
majority of employers, businesses providing services and goods 
to the public, and governmental entities. 
This article will focus on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
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drome (AIDS) and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) dis-
ease as a concrete example of disability discrimination. l This is 
appropriate for several reasons. AIDS is this nation's most liti-
gated disease; it presents a wide range of issues not associated 
with other disabilities. Because once infected a person may have 
10 to 12 years without serious impairment, infected persons have 
many productive work years. A severe social stigma associated 
with AIDS also exists. These issues make the physical challenge 
of the disease all the more difficult. The many years between 
initial infection and death are mentally draining for a person 
who had thought he or she had many years left to enjoy. Too, 
needless discrimination and social stigmatization are killers, for 
they kill the human spirit and destroy human dignity. 
This survey of legal remedies will proceed by considering 
hypothetical and actual cases to appreciate how the remedies 
operate in practical situations. In reviewing possible remedies 
for disability discrimination, we will consider the cases of Bob, 
Carol, Ted, and Alice. Bob's story presents issues of mandatory 
HIV testing and disclosure of a person's HIV status. Carol's 
story presents the troublesome issue of employment discrimina-
tion. Ted's story presents the issue of discrimination by provid-
ers of goods and services to the public. Finally, Alice's story ex-
plores disability-based discrimination in housing. 
B. ABOUT HIV DISCRIMINATION 
There can be no serious question that there is discrimina-
tion against people with AIDS or HIV infection. AIDS-based 
discrimination has been, and continues to be, widespread in em-
ployment, housing, public accommodations, and other areas of 
life. In a well known case, Ryan White, an HIV infected school 
child, was told he could not attend public school because he was 
HIV infected. Although he ultimately won a lawsuit for rein-
statement in school, he and his family were effectively run out of 
1. The term "HIV disease" or "HIV infection" refers to a person who has been in-
fected with HIV whether symptomatic or not. HIV is the viral agent that causes AIDS. A 
person with HIV infection may remain without symptoms for years, although the im-
mune system becomes progressively deficient. With a progressively compromised im-
mune system certain cancers and opportunistic infections develop. When a person with 
HIV infection develops specified defining infections they will be diagnosed with AIDS. 
Thus AIDS is the last phase of HIV infection. 
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their home and forced to move to a different community because 
of hostile attitudes and adverse reactions to his presence.2 The 
three Ray children in Florida provide another well known exam-
ple of parents and neighbors demanding that HIV infected 
school children be removed from the school. Some peoples' hos-
tility about the risk the Ray children presented to neighbors and 
schoolmates was so strong that the Ray home was fire-bombed. 3 
An employee, on leave from work because of his HIV dis-
ease, had his coworkers threaten to kill him if he ever returned 
to work.· Police in Michigan filed a charge of attempted murder 
against an AIDS victim who spat at them. II A Florida judge re-
quired AIDS sufferers to wear masks in his courtroom.6 Not only 
have landlords sought to evict people with HIV infection, but 
people merely perceived to be gay have been refused apartment 
rental.' In Los Angeles paramedics denied prompt assistance to 
a heart attack victim because they feared he had AIDS.8 
Aside from these examples of AIDS discrimination, studies 
and surveys reveal a strong dislike for assoCiation with people 
who are HIV infected. One survey9 of employee attitudes found 
that seventy-five percent of the workers surveyed admitted they 
would be concerned about sharing restroom facilities with people 
with AIDS; forty percent had negative feelings about eating in 
the same cafeteria; thirty-seven percent said they would not 
share the same tools or equipment. Even more troubling, one-
third of those surveyed said they do not believe medical assur-
ances that AIDS can be transmitted only through sexual contact 
or blood contamination. 
2. White v. Western Sch. Corp., No. 85-1192-C, slip op. (S.D. Ind., Aug. 23, 1985). 
3. See Myra MacPherson, The Children and the Flames of Fear, WASH. POST, Sept. 
11, 1987, at Bl. 
4. See Steven Koepp, Living With AIDS on the Job, TIME, Aug. 25, 1986, at 48; see 
also Cronan v. New England Telephone, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273 (Mass. 
1986). 
5. See Ted Gest, As Cases Mount, AIDS Triggers Painful Legal Battles, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP., Mar. 24, 1986, at 73. 
6. David M. Freedman, Wrong Without Remedy, 72 A.B.A.J. 36, 40 (1986). 
7. Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900, 901 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987). 
8. See John W. Parry, AIDS as a Handicapping Condition, 9 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L.REP. 402 (1985). 
9. The Corporate Counsellor, Strong Negative Worker Attitudes Dictate Prompt 
Employer Action on AIDS Policy, 2 CORP. COUNS. 8 (Apr. 1988). 
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Most insurance companies in Texas refuse to sell group 
health coverage to small businesses if one employee has a serious 
medical condition such as AIDS or cancer, according to a survey 
by the Texas Department of Insurance. The survey found that 
almost all insurers attempt to determine if any applicant in an 
underwritten group has AIDS. Most also try to determine if any 
applicant is HIV infected. 10 
Perhaps most troubling are the findings that health care 
providers have strong negative attitudes about treating people 
with HIV infection. A survey of the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA) found that more than half of the physicians who 
responded said they would .not treat HIV infected patients if 
they had a choice.11 A study of primary care physicians in Los 
Angeles County found that a majority refer patients who are 
HIV infected to other doctors.12 A study of doctors in their last 
year of residency as a surgeon or specialist indicated that thirty-
nine percent had refused care to patients with HIV infection.13 
According to another study, HIV -related discrimination re-
ports increased nationwide by fifty percent in 1988, following an 
eighty-eight percent increase in 1987.14 Persons experiencing dis-
crimination simply because of the perception that they were 
HIV infected or because they cared for a person with HIV dis-
ease accounted for thirty percent of the reports of 
discrimination. 111 
Several factors contribute to negative attitudes about peo-
ple with HIV infection. First is the fear, both reasonable and 
unreasonable, of contagion. For example, a surgeon may justifia-
bly have a concern that operating on an HIV infected patient 
10. 2 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 506 (Apr. 22, 1993). 
11. Barbara Gerbert, Bryan T. Maguire, Thomas Bleeker, Thomas J. Coates, & Ste-
phen J. McPhee, Primary Care Physicians and AIDS: Attitudinal and Structural Barri-
ers to Care, 266 JAMA 2837 (1991). 
12. Charles E. Lewis & Kathleen Montgomery, Primary Care Physicians' Refusal to 
Care for Patients Infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 156 W.J. MED. 36 
(1992). 
13. Martin F. Shapiro, Rodney A. Hayward, Didier Guillemot & Didier Jayle, Resi-
dents' Experiences In, and Attitudes Toward, the Cure of Persons with AIDS in Ca-
nada, France and the United States, 268 JAMA 510 (1992). 
14. Epidemic of Fear: A Survey of AIDS Discrimination in the 1980s, 1 AM. FOUND. 
FOR AIDS RES. (1990). 
15. [d. 
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would create a high risk of exposure to HIV. On the other hand, 
there are those who mistakenly believe that HIV is transmitted 
by flies and water fountains. Second is a general aversion of 
many individuals to people with serious illnesses, especially 
those who are dying. Many persons avoid and disassociate them-
selves from people with life threatening diseases. Third, and 
maybe most important, is negative attitudes about homosexuals 
and intravenous drug users, the two population groups in the 
United States where HIV is most prevalent. 
C. AIDS BASICS AND TRANSMISSION RISK 
AIDS was officially recognized as a disease causing death in 
1981 by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), United States 
Public Health Services. In the United States by the end of 1992 
there have been over 170,000 deaths reported from AIDS, over 
250,000 diagnosed cases of AIDS, and an estimated one million 
infected with HIV, but not yet diagnosed with AIDS. IS World-
wide there are 2.5 millionl7 estimated AIDS cases, with an esti-
mated 14 millionl8 people infected with HIV. In the United 
States AIDS has become the second most frequent killer of men 
ages 25-44 and the sixth most frequent killer of young women. IS 
AIDS is now near the top of death-causing conditions in years of 
potential life lost.20 
In the early years of the epidemic there was understandable 
confusion and ignorance as to the nature of the disease and its 
modes of transmission. However, by 1985 there was and remains 
a consensus of public health officials and medical research 
authorities as to the basics of AIDS, its causative agent, HIV, 
and the way HIV is transmitted from one person to another.21 
16. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
HIV/AIDS Surveillance: Year End Edition (Feb. 1993); Centers for Disease Control, 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Facts About the Scope of the HIV/ 
AIDS Epidemic in the United States, (Feb. 1993). 
17. World Health Organization, The Current Global Situation of the HIV/AIDS 
Pandemic, at 1-2 (Jan. 4, 1993). 
18. Geoffrey Cowley & Mary Hager, What If a Cure is Far-Off?, NEWSWEEK, June 
21, 1993, at 70. 
19.Id. 
20. Years of Potential Life Lost Before Age 65-United States, 1990 and 1991, 42 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 251 (1993). 
21. See generally U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, U.S. Surgeon Gen-
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AIDS is caused by infection of an individual with HIV, a 
retrovirus that penetrates the chromosomes of certain human 
immunity cells that combat infection throughout the body.22 
People infected with HIV may remain without symptoms for a 
number of years. As the disease progresses, however, a number 
of symptoms can occur. Eventually, the virus destroys its host 
cells, thereby weakening the victims' immune systems. When the 
immune system becomes compromised, the infected person be-
comes susceptible to a variety of so-called "opportunistic infec-
tions," many of which can prove fata1. 23 
Transmission of HIV from an infected person to an 
uninfected person is known to occur in three ways: (1) through 
intimate sexual contact; (2) through invasive exposure to con-
taminated blood or certain other bodily fluids; or (3) through 
perinatal exposure from mother to infant. Although HIV has 
been isolated in several body fluids, the epidemiologic evidence 
has implicated only blood, semen, vaginal secretions, and possi-
bly breast milk in transmission.24 
Most importantly, the weight of scientific evidence and ex-
perience indicate that HIV is not an airborne infection spread 
through casual contact between people at the workplace, in 
schools, or in other general public association. 211 There is no ap-
preciable risk of HIV transmission through close, nonsexual con-
tact with HIV infected persons.26 As the infected person's im-
mune system deteriorates, the HIV infected person becomes 
increasingly susceptible to opportunistic infection. These infec-
tions do not cause AIDS, nor do they increase the risk of trans-
mission of HIV. However, some of these opportunistic infec-
tions, such as tuberculosis, may themselves be communicable to 
others in casual, nonsexual contact. 
eral's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (1986). 
22. See general.!y Anthony S. Fauci, The Human Immunodeficiency Virus: Infectiv-
ity and Mechanisms of Pathogenesis, 239 SCIENCE 617 (Feb. 5, 1988). 
23. Chalk v. U.S. District Court, 840 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1988). 
24. Gerald Friedland & Robert Klein, Transmission of the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus, 317 N. ENG. J. MED. 1125 (1987). 
25. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 70l. 
26. [d. at 706. 
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D. CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH STATUS INFORMATION 
Confidentiality of medical information is a major factor in 
protecting against unnecessary discrimination based on one's 
health condition. Statutes in nearly all jurisdictions have long 
sought to protect against unauthorized disclosures of medical in-
formation. 27 In addition, most jurisdictions recognize a general 
or constitutional right to privacy which protects health and 
medical information.28 
However, the strong negative social stigma associated with 
AIDS has prompted great concern by the public to identify HIV 
infected persons. It follows that to the extent that an individ-
ual's HIV status is unknown, he or she is less likely to be sub-
jected to HIV based discrimination. Once it becomes known that 
a person is HIV infected the chance of discrimination is greatly 
increased. Additionally, people who provide care for AIDS pa-
tients and people perceived to be at high risk of HIV infection 
are subjected to discrimination even though they may be HIV 
negative. 
Given this pervasive discrimination, California and some 
other jurisdictions have enacted statutes specifically protecting 
information concerning a person's HIV status.29 The California 
enactment essentially prohibits requiring an HIV test and dis-
closing a person's HIV test status. Some jurisdictions have anon-
ymous HIV testing programs whereby the name of a person sub-
mitting to an HIV test is never known. Even if there is a name-
linked HIV test, identification of a test subject is protected by 
general privacy and confidentiality laws. 
Fear of stigmatization and discriminatory retribution has 
discouraged people from being tested for HIV. Without testing 
there can be no early medical intervention which could prolong 
the quality of life of a person with HIV infection. And if that 
person knows he or she is HIV infected, he or she can take steps 
to keep from transmitting it to others. Thus it can be said that a 
27. See, e.g., Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.37 
(West 1982 & Supp. 1993). 
28. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
29. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.20-.27 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993). 
8
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breach in confidentiality and the threat of the resulting discrimi-
nation exacerbates the conditions associated with the HIV in-
fected person's health and treatment. In short, confidentiality 
breach and discrimination are bad medicine. 
II. BOB: MANDATORY HIV TESTING AND 
DISCLOSURES 
A. BOB'S STORY 
Bob is an ardent anti-abortionist. He has participated in 
several demonstrations protesting abortions. At one of these 
demonstrations, Bob and other protesters blocked the entry 
door to an abortion clinic preventing employees and clients from 
entering the premises. Upon their arrival, the police ordered the 
demonstrators to cease blocking the entry way. The protestors 
refused, making it necessary for the officers to arrest the protes-
tors. Bob went limp, and had to be physically lifted by two of-
ficers from the entry way. It was a hot day and Bob's perspira-
tion got on the officers. 
Shortly after this encounter with Bob one of the officers be-
came concerned that he could get AIDS just by touching some-
one who was infected. The officer had no reason to believe the 
arrestee was infected. Nevertheless, the officer's superior con-
tacted Bob, requesting that he voluntarily take an HIV test. Bob 
indignantly refused. Thus, the following questions arise: can an 
arresting officer require an HIV test of a resisting arrestee where 
there was some touching and bodily fluid contact, although there 
is no reason to believe the arrestee is infected? If so, what dis-
closures of the HIV test results would be lawful? 
B. SEARCH, PRIVACY AND COMPULSORY HIV TESTING 
There are two basic issues presented when an officer seeks 
involuntary HIV testing: first, the lawfulness of requiring sub-
mission to an HIV test; second, disclosure and dissemination of 
the results of a compulsory HIV test. Requiring an HIV test of a 
resisting arrestee and disclosing the results invokes the constitu-
. tional right to be free of unreasonable searches and the constitu-
tional right to privacy. 
9
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1. Freedom from Unreasonable Search 
Generally, people are not subject to involuntary blood test-
ing at the demand of an officer absent justification under reason-
able circumstances. The Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution guarantees freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. There is no doubt that compulsory blood 
tests are searches subject to the Fourth Amendment.so Whether 
an involuntary blood test is reasonable, and thus lawful, depends 
on the justifying circumstances, namely the existence of proba-
ble cause and the appropriateness of the manner of the intrusion 
for testing. slOne example of a reasonable search is a blood test 
where there is probable cause to believe the test subject was 
driving while intoxicated.s2 Most case law focusing on reasona-
bleness addresses whether mandatory blood testing for HIV is 
reasonable. 
Sections 199.20 to 199.27 of the California Health and 
Safety Code prohibit involuntary HIV testing and protect the 
privacy of people who take an HIV test or any AIDS test. There-
fore, under the statute, it is unlawful to negligently or willfully 
disclose results of an HIV or AIDS test or identify a test sub-
ject. ss The statute makes it unlawful to use HIV or AIDS test 
results for the "determination of insurability or suitability for 
employment."s, Moreover, the statute makes it unlawful to com-
pel in administrative, judicial, or legislative proceedings identifi-
cation of an HIV or AIDS test subject.slI An unlawful "disclos-
ure" includes release, transfer, dissemination or other 
communication except where the statute authorizes a disclos-
ure.sa Unlawful disclosures are punishable by civil and criminal 
sanctions ranging from a fine of $1000 to $10,000 and, for willful 
30. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
31. Pumping a person's stomach for possible illegal drug consumption has been held 
unnecessarily intrusive and an unreasonable search. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952). 
32. See Penn Lerblance, Implied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 
53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 39 (1978). 
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21a-b (West Supp. 1993). 
34. Id. § 199.21(0. 
35. Id. § 199.20 (West 1990). 
36. Id. §§ 199.21(k).(l) (West Supp. 1993). 
10
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disclosures, one year imprisonment.87 Violators of the statute are 
liable for actual damages, including damages for economic, bod-
ily, or psychological harm which are a proximate result of the 
disclosure.88 
There are exceptions to the ban on involuntary testing and 
non-disclosure requirements of the California Health and Safety 
Code.89 Relevant to our inquiry is one statutory exception which 
was enacted through a voters' initiative. This exception, section 
199.97, authorizes an arresting officer, through a court order, to 
compel HIV testing of a resisting arrestee where the officer's 
skin comes in contact with bodily fluids of the arrestee. 
Section 199.97 survived a constitutional challenge in 
Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court,·o where the court of appeal 
held that the statute's authorization of compulsory HIV testing 
was reasonable and did not violate the right to be free of unrea-
sonable search. Johnetta J. became unruly at a court hearing on 
child dependency in the process of which Johnetta, while being 
restrained, bit an officer, drawing blood. Subsequently, the of-
ficer requested that Johnetta be tested for HIV, although there 
was no reason to believe she was HIV infected. She refused and 
the officer then requested a court to order the testing pursuant 
to section 199.97. A test was ordered and on appeal the court 
upheld the constitutionality of section 199.97 upon a finding of 
probable cause to believe there was a transmission of saliva to 
the officer through a bite; that HIV is present in saliva; and that 
there was a theoretical possibility that HIV could be transmitted 
by a human bite.41 The court acknowledged that there were no 
documented instances of HIV transmission through a bite, and 
that the weight of medical authorities says there is no substan-
tial risk of transmission through a bite. 
Interestingly, the court concluded that it was not necessary 
that there be probable cause to believe that the arrestee was 
HIV infected. It should be noted that in Johnetta the court 
found that there was at least a theoretical transmission of HIV 
37. [d. §§ 199.21(aHc). 
38. [d. § 199.21(d). 
39. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 199.24, 199.25 (West 1990). 
40. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1990). 
41. [d. at 673-74. 
11
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in saliva to the officer through a bite that breaks the skin. Be-
cause intact skin protects against HIV, it might be argued in 
Bob's case that an officer who comes into contact with an arres-
tee's perspiration encounters no theoretical possibility of HIV 
transmission. So Johnetta is distinguishable. 
There are other statutory exceptions to California's prohibi-
tion against mandatory HIV testing, especially concerning peo-
ple convicted of a crime and incarcerated in correctional institu-
tions.42 In Love v. Superior Court48 the court of appeal upheld 
the constitutionality of a statutory exception authorizing invol-
untary testing of persons convicted of prostitution. Similarly, in 
People v. Mc Vickers44 the California Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the statutory exception ·authorizing involun-
tary HIV testing for anyone convicted of certain sex crimes. Spe-
cifically the Mc Vickers court held that because a blood test for 
AIDS was not a punishment, there was no ex post facto violation 
in the retroactive application of the mandatory HIV testing of 
convicted sex offenders. The Mc Vickers court found that the 
statute had the necessary element of an objective, legitimate 
state interest because the purpose of mandatory testing of sex 
offenders is to prevent the spread of AIDS.4I! The statutory au-
thorizations for involuntary testing of arrestees and persons con-
victed of a crime contain very strict limitations upon who can 
receive the information about an HIV test subject. Such disclo-
sures are limited to court officials, police officials, and correc-
tions officials. 
Courts have upheld California's statutory prohibition 
against involuntary HIV testing except where authorized by a 
statutory exception. For example, identification of blood donors 
has become an important issue where tainted donated blood has 
caused HIV infection. In Irwin Memorial Blood Centers v. Su-
42. The California Penal Code authorizes compulsory testing for convicted prosti-
tutes, § 1202.6 (West Supp. 1993), as well as for persons convicted of certain sex of-
fenses, § 1202. Other examples of authorized testing and disclosure include: disclosure 
by treating physicians, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.22(a) (West 1990); disclosure 
by health care providers, § 199.215; testing on cadavers, § 199.22(b); testing at alterna-
tive testing sites, § 199.22(a); testing for medical research, § 199.22(c); and warnings to 
sex and needle partners, § 199.25. 
43. 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (Ct. App. 1991). 
44. 840 P.2d 955 (Cal. 1992). 
45. Id. at 959-60. 
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perior Court46 the court concluded that the deposition of blood 
donors with the use of screens or anonymously is an unlawful 
identification of those tested for HIV. Identification of blood do-
nors tested for HIV would, according to the court, violate the 
statutory bar. 
As to Bob's situation, the compulsory HIV test is sought on 
the basis of section 199.97 which authorizes such a test when the 
resisting arrestee's bodily fluids come in contact with the of-
ficer's skin. Because Bob's perspiration came into contact with 
the officer's skin, arguably there is authorization for testing Bob. 
However, to the extent that section 199.97 permits a compulsory 
test when perspiration gets on skin, the statute appears to con-
flict with the constitutional right to be free of unreasonable 
search. Because perspiration-to-skin is not a realistic HIV expo-
sure and because no substantial risk of HIV transmission exists, 
it is submitted that there is no probable cause of possible infec-
tion which means that the testing search is unreasonable. Thus 
Bob may have a cause of action under the constitutional right to 
be free of unreasonable search. 
2. The Right to Privacy 
Separate from the issue of whether the right to be free from 
unreasonable search is violated by an involuntary HIV test 
search, although closely related by overlapping analysis, is the 
question of whether the right to privacy is violated by an officer-
directed compulsory HIV test. A person's privacy rights under 
these circumstances are invoked by the involuntary test, the tak-
ing of the blood sample, and disclosure of the results of such a 
test. As to Bob's situation, the privacy interest inquiry has a 
twofold focus; first, does a compulsory HIV test upon an officer's 
request violate the test subject's right to privacy; second, does 
disclosure or dissemination of the HIV test result violate a right 
to privacy. 
a. Privacy and Testing 
A right to privacy may be predicated upon the United 
46. 279 Cal. Rptr. 911 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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States Constitution, the California Constitution, or a common 
law tort of invasion of privacy. However, the analysis is much 
the same regardless of which cause of action is in play. In Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that 
"[v]arious guarantees [of the U.S. Constitution Bill of Rights] 
create zones of privacy."47 "[T]he basic test as to whether there 
has been an unconstitutional invasion of privacy is whether the 
person has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy which is 
objectively reasonable and, if so, whether that expectation has 
been violated by unreasonable governmental intrusion."48 This 
reasonable expectations test, fashioned in Fourth Amendment 
analysis, serves as the basic test in right to privacy analysis 
under the United States Constitution and the California 
Constitution.49 
There seems little doubt that a person has an expectation of 
privacy concerning his or her blood and tests that may be made 
on a blood sample. The second part of the analysis, however, is 
whether compulsory testing is an unreasonable intrusion into an 
expectation of privacy. It is at this point that the interests of the 
state in compulsory testing must be weighed against the serious-
ness of the privacy invasion. In Johnetta the court of appeal up-
held compulsory HIV testing of an arrestee who bit an officer.llo 
In so doing the court found no violation of the right to privacy 
because of the compelling state interest in preventing the spread 
of AIDS and in the lessened privacy expectation of an arrested 
person. 
As to Bob's situation, the HIV testing was a governmental 
invasion of his expectation of privacy. The pivotal question is 
whether it was reasonable. At issue is whether the state's inter-
ests outweigh his expectation of privacy. Given the lack of a sub-
stantial risk of transmission of HIV through an infected person's 
perspiration coming in contact with the officer's intact skin, it is 
a persuasive argument that the blood testing intrusion was not 
reasonable. Thus while the facts in Johnetta (possible saliva en-
tering the blood through a bite) may justify a reasonable intru-
sion, the facts in Bob's case (perspiration in contact with intact 
47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
48. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1967). 
49. Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354, 358 (Ct. App. 1991). 
50. Johnetta J. v. Municipal Ct., 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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skin) may be considered an unreasonable intrusion. Where there 
is no substantial risk of transmission through perspiration, there 
is no compelling state interest which would override the expecta-
tion of privacy in one's blood. 
b. Privacy and Disclosures 
That brings us to consideration of the second part of the 
privacy analysis, namely, disclosure of the HIV test results iden-
tifying the test subject. Under the statutory scheme of section 
199.97, which authorizes blood testing for HIV, the purpose of 
the HIV test is to notify the officer whether the arrestee's blood 
was positive or negative for the presence of HIV antibodies. The 
authorized disclosures of HIV test results under section 199.97 
include the test subject, the officer who was assaulted, the of-
ficer's employer, and the State Department of Health Services. III 
Further disclosures are not authorized. The disclosure to the test 
subject and the assaulted officer would appear to be reasonable 
given the purpose of the statute, which is primarily to curtail the 
spread of the disease and allow for early medical intervention. 
However, it is questionable that a disclosure to the officer's em-
ployer, not being a party to a possible virus transmission, serves 
the statutory purpose. Likewise, because HIV infection is not 
generally reported to public health officials, it is debatable that 
such a disclosure is reasonable. Under section 199.97 disclosures 
other than those specified would be unlawful. Although identify-
ing disclosure to the officer's employer and to public health offi-
cials may be authorized by the statute, section 199.97 may run 
afoul of the constitutional right to privacy regarding the disclos-
ure to the officer's employer and the public health officials. 
In a landmark decision, Urbaniak v. Newton, the California 
Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to privacy re-
garding the disclosure of a person's HIV status.1I2 In Urbaniak 
the court concluded that a right to privacy arises in disclosure of 
HIV positive status to a health care worker for the purpose of 
alerting the worker to the need for taking safety precautions in 
handling medical implements contaminated with infected 
51. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.97 (West 1990). 
52. 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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blood. 53 
Urbaniak received a head injury at work and was seeking 
worker's compensation. He participated in a medical examina-
tion to ascertain the extent of his injury which was arranged by 
the employer's defense counsel. After the physician had com-
pleted the examination and had left the room, Urbaniak became 
concerned about blood traces on reusable metal electrodes with 
sharp points used on Urbaniak during the examination. While 
only Urbaniak and a nurse were present, Urbaniak cautioned the 
nurse about careful sterilizing of the electrodes because he had 
tested positive for HIV. Urbaniak's HIV infection subsequently 
appeared in the examining physician's report, which was distrib-
uted to the insurer, counsel for Urbaniak, defense counsel, the 
Workers Compensation Appeals Board, and Urbaniak's 
chiropractor. 
The court found that Urbaniak's disclosure to the nurse was 
intended solely for her benefit in cleaning the electrodes. Thus 
at issue was whether the nurse's disclosure to the physician, the 
physician's disclosure in his report, and the dissemination of the 
report were an invasion of privacy. 
In defining the constitutional right to privacy the court held 
that the constitution conferred a judicial right of action for dam-
ages and that its protection was against invasions of privacy by 
private citizens as well as by the state. 54 The test adopted was a 
blend of federal law and common law tort. Key points of the test 
adopted are as follows: an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy; public disclosure of true, embarrassing private facts; 
and the concept of improper use of information properly 
obtained. 55 
In applying that test, the court found that Urbaniak had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding his disclosure to the 
nurse. Moreover, the disclosure was of true, embarrassing pri-
vate facts. Thus the further disclosure, beyond his comment to 
the nurse, of Urbaniak's HIV infection was improper use of in-
formation properly obtained. The court found an important 
53. [d. at 357. 
54. ld. 
55. ld. at 358-59. 
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public interest in a patient's disclosure of his HIV status for the 
purpose of alerting a health care worker to the need for safety 
precautions. The court reasoned: "In the field of health care, dis-
closure of information about a patient constitutes 'improper use' 
when it will subvert a public interest favoring communication of 
confidential information by violating the patient's reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy."~6 
As to Bob's situation, the disclosure of his HIV test to him-
self and the assaulted officer would not violate an expectation of 
privacy because the purpose of the statute was to alert the as-
saulted officer in the event of Bob's infection. The statutory au-
thorization serves as a declaration of public interest in informing 
the officer. Although allowed by the statute, the disclosures to 
the officer's employer and the public health officials might be 
challenged as going beyond the public interest and the special 
need of the statute. These disclosures will not serve the purpose 
of alerting (or comforting) the assaulted officer. Clearly, disclos-
ure of Bob's HIV infection is a private fact which may prove to 
be embarrassing and objectionable to a reasonable person of or-
dinary sensibilities. 
On the other hand, it might be contended that, because of 
the statutory authorization, the assaulting arrestee has a less-
ened expectation of privacy as to the disclosures to the officer's 
employer and the public health officials. In addition, that the 
test subject was an arrestee subject to custody may serve to 
lessen a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
One point is clear: disclosures beyond those authorized by 
the statute would be unlawful as a violation of section 199.97 
and the right to privacy. Unauthorized disclosures of a person's 
HIV status may, under certain circumstances, violate other laws 
as well as California's statutory scheme of the California Health 
and Safety Code. For example, in Doe v. Borough of Barring-
ton~7 an unauthorized disclosure of a person's HIV status by a 
police officer was held to violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
While driving a vehicle, Doe and her husband were stopped by 
the Barrington police. The police arrested Doe's husband. Doe 
56. [d. at 360-61. 
57. 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990). 
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and Doe's husband told the investigating officer that he, Doe's 
husband, was HIV infected. Although the information was vol-
untarily given to the officer, the officer subsequently told the 
Does' neighbors that Doe's husband was HIV infected. This 
communication by the officer to the neighbor, the court rea-
soned, served no legitimate purpose, and thereby constituted an 
unlawful invasion of privacy. In finding an unlawful invasion of 
privacy by the officer, the court observed: 
The sensitive nature of medical information 
about AIDS makes a compelling argument for 
keeping this information confidential. Society's 
moral judgments about the high-risk activities as-
sociated with the disease, including sexual rela-
tions and drug use, make the information of the 
most personal kind. Also, the privacy interest in 
one's exposure to the AIDS virus is even greater 
than one's privacy interest in ordinary medical 
records because of the stigma that attaches with 
the disease. The potential for harm in the event 
of a nonconsensual disclosure is substan-
tial. ... 118 
Because the privacy invasion was made by a police officer, his 
disclosure constituted a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
which prohibits the denial of a civil right by state police officers. 
It should be noted that in addition to statutory authoriza-
tion for compulsory HIV testing and disclosure, it has been held 
that courts have the equitable authority to order a compulsory 
HIV test under certain circumstances. In a Wisconsin case, Syr-
ing v. Tucker, the court found that the circumstances justified a 
court-ordered HIV test absent statutory authorization.lle Tucker, 
a Dade County Wisconsin Social Services client, became disrup-
tive in the office of Syring, a social worker. Tucker bit Syring on 
a forearm when Syring physically restrained Tucker from hitting 
a county security guard who was trying to remove her from the 
office. After Tucker bit Syring she yelled at Syring that she had 
AIDS. In upholding a trial court's equitable authority to order a 
physical exam the court found that an order for an HIV test and 
disclosure was constitutional because Tucker had given up her 
58. [d. at 384. 
59. Syring v. Tucker, 498 N.W.2d 370 (Wis. 1993). 
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expectations of privacy when she shouted she had AIDS. "Any 
legitimate expectations of privacy that Tucker might have had 
as to her HIV or AIDS status were forfeited when she publicly 
announced she had AIDS. "60 
In summary of Bob's situation the question is whether a 
compulsory HIV test is lawful and, if so, are certain disclosures 
of the test result lawful? It might appear that under section 
199.97 the compulsory test and disclosures are authorized and 
thus lawful because all that is necessary under the statute· is 
bodily fluid contact with the officer's skin. However, because 
perspiration-to-skin is not a means of HIV transmission, and 
presents no realistic risk of infection, Bob has a defense to the 
statute's test authorization based on the constitutional right to 
be free of an unreasonable search and the constitutional right to 
privacy. Bob's expectation of privacy is not outweighed by any 
substantial public interest. If the test is unlawful, there would 
be no lawful basis to distribute the test results. If the compul-
sory test is found to be lawful, distribution of the test result to 
the officer's employer and the public health officials is subject to 
a constitutional right to privacy challenge because such disclo-
sures lack a valid public interest. 
III. CAROL: EMPLOYMENT CONFIDENTIALITY AND 
DISCRIMINATION 
A. CAROL'S STORY 
Carol has worked for Southcoast Advertising, an Oceanside, 
California advertising firm, for five years. The firm's workforce 
consists of the two partners, two full-time secretaries, and 22 
consultants, including Carol, who are employed on a "contract 
basis." Carol is a participant in Southcoast's group health insur-
ance program. Carol works over 40 hours per week at the 
Southcoast office. Southcoast Advertising was contacted by a 
former United States Senator from Indiana who is campaigning 
for the presidency of the United States. The former senator 
wants Southcoast to run his campaign in California. The sena-
tor, as a prospective client, advises Southcoast that as a condi-
tion to the deal it would be necessary for Southcoast personnel 
60. [d. at 378. 
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to be tested for illegal drug use and for HIV. The senator de-
clared he wanted a "squeaky clean campaign," without any em-
barrassing revelations. Southcoast decided that the senator's 
testing request was reasonable under the circumstances. There-
upon Southcoast advised all of its personnel that they would 
have to submit to a blood test for illegal drugs and HIV status. 
Carol, eager to keep her position with Southcoast, submitted to 
the requested blood tests. Unfortunately for Carol, she tested 
positive for HIV. This news came as a shocking surprise to Carol 
because she did not consider herself at risk for HIV infection. 
Because she tested positive for HIV, Southcoast terminated her 
employment. 
Carol's scenario presents two primary issues. The first is the 
legality of the requirement for an HIV test as a condition of em-
ployment. The second primary issue is the legality of Southcoast 
Advertising's termination of Carol's employment because of her 
positive HIV test result. 
B. EMPLOYER MANDATED HIV TESTING61 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) contains 
express language governing applicant interviewing and hiring 
procedures. The gist of this provision of the ADA, section 
102(c),62 is that no inquiries may be made by the employer re-
garding an applicant's disabilities, nor can the employer require 
a pre-employment physical examination. After an offer of em-
ployment has been made by the employer, a medical exam may 
be required of all newly hired employees. The language of this 
ADA provision expressly refers to the hiring process rather than 
to the employees who have been in the work force for a number 
of years. However, it may be that ADA section 102(c) applies to 
all employees, not just those in the initial hiring process. If so it 
61. As to the blood test requirement, it is interesting to note that the Federal Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act) and the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA) do not have express provisions concerning mandatory testing as a 
condition for employment. For the most part these two statutes are not confidentiality 
statutes. Instead, they speak to discriminatory action. It could be reasoned that there 
would be discriminatory action if only some employees were selected for blood testing. 
However, where all personnel are required to submit to a blood test there does not ap-
pear to be disability discriminatory acts like those prohibited by the Rehabilitation Act 
or the FEHA. 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12,1l2(d)(2) (Supp. III 1991). 
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might be argued that random or selective testing of employees 
would' he unlawful, while testing of all employees would be 
lawful. 
As noted, many jurisdictions have statutes protecting confi-
dentiality of medical information. In addition to a general confi-
dentiality statute, California Health & Safety sections 199.20 to 
199.27 specifically address confidentiality of HIV test results. 
The statutes prohibit mandatory HIV testing for purposes of 
employment and make unlawful all unauthorized disclosures of 
HIV tests.63 Under the facts of Carol's scenario Southcoast is in 
violation of the California statutory scheme because they have 
made submission to an HIV test a condition of employment. 
However, Carol's mandatory HIV testing does not appear to 
violate California's Confidentiality of Medical Information Act 
which prohibits unauthorized third-party disclosures of medical 
information.64 Under the facts of Carol's scenario, Carol submit-
ted to the HIV test as a condition of continuing employment. 
There is no third-party disclosure of information as there would 
be if, for example, her employer were to disclose Carol's HIV 
status to someone. 
C. DISCRIMINATORY JOB TERMINATION 
The second primary issue in Carol's scenario is the legality 
of her job termination by South coast Advertising based on 
Carol's positive HIV test. 
1. Rehabilitation Act 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973,611 which prohibits discrimi-
nation based on handicap by entities receiving federal money, 
would apply to Carol's case if the jurisdictional requirements of 
63. It may be argued that for purposes of §§ 199.20 to 199.27 the distinction be-
tween employee and independent contractor is irrelevant as both concern employment in 
the broad general use of the term "employment." Moreover, these sections are not lim-
ited in applicability to employers of more than a specified number of employees as is the 
ADA. 
64. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.13 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). 
6.'). 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1988 & Supp. 1991), as amended by Pub. L. No. 102-
f>69, J06 Stat. 4346 (1992). 
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the Rehabilitation Act were present. The first requirement is 
that the daimant have a handicap.as The second is that the al-
leged discrimination be committed by an entity receiving federal 
money. Carol would win on the first requirement, but would 
likely lose on the second requirement. 
a. Defining Handicap 
The first jurisdictional requirement turns upon whether 
Carol's positive HIV status is a handicap.67 Arguments that a 
positive HIV status is not a handicap have not been well re-
ceived by the courts. In a landmark decision, School Board of 
Nassau County v. Arline,6s the United States Supreme Court 
held that a person with a contagious disease can be a handi-
capped person within the meaning of section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973. More specifically, in Chalk v. United States 
District Court, a circuit court of appeals held that a person with 
AIDS is a handicapped person within the meaning of the Reha-
bilitation Act.6s Several other courts have ruled that the Reha-
bilitation Act is an available remedy for persons with HIV 
infection.70 
The Rehabilitation Act provides that no "otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individual" shall, solely by reason of his handi-
cap, be excluded from participation in any program receiving 
federal financial assistance.71 "Handicapped individual" is de-
fined to mean any person who "(i) has a physical ... impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more of [his or her] ma-
jor life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) 
66. The term "handicap" is used in the Rehabilitation Act, in the Federal Fair 
Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), and in many state statutes. The term "disability" is 
used in the Americans with Disabilities Act and in the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act. For purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, FHAA, ADA, and California 
FEHA, the term "handicap" and the term "disability" have the same definition. In this 
paper the t.erms are used interchangeably. However, some state "handicap" statutes de-
fine handicap differently than do the federal statutes. Under some state statutes "handi-
cap" does not include contagious diseases or mental impairment. 
67. See Annotation, Who is "Individual with Handicap.~" Under Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, 97 A.L.R. FED 40 (1990). 
68. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
69. Chalk v. United States District Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988). 
70. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
71. 29 U.S.C. § 706; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.13 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). 
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is regarded as having such an impairment."72 "Major life activi-
ties" is defined so as to include working.73 
Arline, who had several incidents of tuberculosis over the 
years, was fired from her elementary school teaching position by 
t.he Nassau County School Board because of her continually re-
c:un'ing tuberculosis. The Supreme Court ruled that Arline's his-
tory of tuberculosis, which affected her respiratory system, and 
thus substantially limited "one or more of [her] major life activi-
ties," established that she had a "record of .... impairment" 
which qualified her as handicapped.74 In addition, the Court 
held that the fact that her handicap was a contagious disease did 
not necessarily mean that Arline was not "otherwise qualified" 
for her job under section 504.75 
"Otherwise qualified" normally means that the claimant can 
perform the tasks of the job in question despite his or her handi-
cap with reasonable accommodation by the employer.7s How-
ever, Arline had been dismissed not because she could not per-
form her job, but because of her recurrences of tuberculosis, 
which constituted a "record of ... impairment." Under these 
facts, whether she was otherwise qualified depended on whether 
her condition would expose others to significant health and 
safety risks. Whether the person handicapped with a contagious 
disease presents an unacceptable "safety risk" can only be deter-
mined by an individualized inquiry.77 Because the trial court in 
Arline did not make sufficient factual findings on this issue, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of 
whether Arline was "otherwise qualified." 
72. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(8). 
73. 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1993). 
74. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281. 
75. Id. at 285-86. 
76. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1993). 
77. This inquiry should include findings of facts: 
based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of 
medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the 
disease is transmitted), (b)the duration of the risk (how long is 
the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the 
potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the 
disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of 
harm. 
Arline, 4HO U.S. at 288 (citing Brief for AMA as Amicus Curiae at 19). 
23
Lerblance: Disability Discrimination
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
330 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:307 
The Arline decision was the principle guide in Chalk v. 
United States District Court which held that a school teacher 
with AIDS was handicapped within the meaning and protection 
of the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically the court in Chalk con-
cluded that petitioner Chalk, a classroom school teacher who 
was removed from his teaching duties because he had been diag-
nosed with AIDS, was entitled to a preliminary injunction to re-
store him to his former duties as a classroom teacher. The court 
in Chalk found that the Supreme Court's Arline decision settled 
the question of whether a person handicapped by a contagious 
disease was within the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act. The 
only remaining question was whether petitioner Chalk was "oth-
erwise qualified" for his former teaching position. Unless Chalk 
met this standard, he was not eligible for relief under the Reha-
bilitation Act. 
Reiterating the Arline standard, the Chalk court noted that 
an "otherwise qualified" individual, in the employment context, 
is one who can perform the essential functions of the job in 
question in spite of his or her handicap, with reasonable accom-
modations if appropriate. Thus the issue was whether Chalk 
could perform the essential functions of the job as a classroom 
teacher without creating a substantial risk to the health and 
safety of others. After noting how the AIDS virus was transmit-
ted, the court concluded that Chalk's present condition did not 
create a substantial risk to the health and safety of his students 
or others. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Chalk court applied the Ar-
line standard which requires a factual inquiry to determine if a 
person handicapped by a contagious disease presents a substan-
tial risk to the health and safety of others. The Chalk court ob-
served that this risk analysis does not require proof of complete 
certainty that there is absolutely no present or future risk, be-
cause this would be an impossible burden of proof on the claim-
ant. "Little in science can be proved with complete certainty, 
and section 504 does not require such a test. "78 The court held 
that it was error to require that the claimant disprove every the-
oretical possibility of harm.79 Rather the focus is whether there 
78. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 707. 
79. [d. at 709. 
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is a substantial risk to the health of others. In reaching that 
determination, deference should be given to reasonable medical 
judgments of public health officials. 
The substantial risk inquiry must be guided by the goal of 
section 504 which is "protecting handicapped individuals from 
deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, 
while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns of 
[employers] as avoiding exposing others to significant health and 
safety risks."80 A significant risk of transmission is a legitimate 
concern which could justify exclusion of the employee if the risk 
could not be eliminated through reasonable accommodation. 
The court rejected the argument that exclusion could be justi-
fied on the basis of pernicious mythologies, irrational fear, 
prejudiced attitudes or ignorance.81 
In addition to Arline and Chalk several courts have ruled 
that an HIV infected school child cannot be excluded from 
school merely because of the child's HIV infection. The courts 
are in agreement that a school child with HIV infection is handi-
capped within the meaning of section 504, subject to the limita-
tions of not posing a direct health threat and the ability to per-
form the tasks required of all students.82 
Accordingly, under the facts of Carol's scenario, her HIV in-
fection would be classified as a handicap for purposes of section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 
b. Federal Funding Requirement 
Carol's case, however, does not satisfy the second jurisdic-
tional requirement that the disability-based discrimination must 
be by an entity which is a recipient of federal funding. While 
most public schools, as in Chalk, receive federal funding, most 
private businesses, like Southcoast, do not. Thus the Rehabilita-
tion Act section 504 would not provide a legal remedy for Carol. 
80. [d. at 705; Arline, 480 U.S. at 287. 
81. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 711. 
82. See, e.g., Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 
1986); Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Dis-
trict 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986). 
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2. Americans with Disabilities Act 
Another possible remedy for Carol's job termination is Title 
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).83 
Broadly speaking, the ADA guarantees equal opportunity for 
qualified individuals with disabilities in employment (Title I), in 
access to services and benefits provided by state and local gov-
ernments (Title II), in equal access to goods and services pro-
vided by private commercial entities (Title 111), and in telecom-
munications access (Title IV).84 The ADA was patterned after 
the Rehabilitation Act, its regulations, and its interpretive case 
law.8!! The Rehabilitation Act, however, only covered entities re-
ceiving federal funding. Title I of the ADA prohibits disability-
based discrimination by all employers, public or private, for-
profit or not-for-profit, if they have twenty-five or more employ-
ees for each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks per 
year.86 
Title I of the ADA protects "covered employees" from disa-
bility-based discrimination on the job. "Covered employee" is 
defined as any "qualified individual with a disability," which 
means any person with a disability who, with or without reason-
able accommodation, can perform the essential function of the 
employment position in question.87 An employer can defend a 
charge of disability discrimination by proving that the employee 
is not qualified for the job because that person poses a direct 
threat to the health or safety of others in the workplace.88 
A person with a "disability" is defined by the ADA as: (a) a 
person with any physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities; (b) any per-
son with a record of such impairment; and (c) a person regarded 
as having such an impairment whether or not they are in fact 
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-213 (Supp. III 1991). 
84. For a description of the ADA see Penn Lerblance, Introducing the Americans 
with Disabilities Act: Promises and Challenges, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 149 (1992). 
85. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,740-53 (1991) (App. to 29 C.F.R. § 1630). 
86. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) § 101(5), 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5). After 
,July 26, 1994, an employer with fifteen or more employees will be covered. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 16:30.2(e) (1992). 
87. ADA § 101(8); 42 U.S.C. § 12,111 (8). 
88. ADA § lO:3(b); 42·U.S.C. § 12,113(b). 
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impaired.S9 The ADA regulations specify that a person with 
u~ymptomatic or symptomatic HIV infection is disabled within 
the meaning of the Act.I/O Accordingly, Title I of the ADA would 
cover Carol's job termination based on her HIV infection. 
The difficult issue for Carol, in seeking relief under the 
ADA, is whether she is an "employee" and if her employer has 
twenty-five or more "employees." 
Generally the law has recognized a significant distinction 
between an "employee" and an "independent contractor." The 
line between employees and independent contractors is not al-
ways easily drawn. Whether a person is an employee or an inde-
pendent contractor is essentially a fact question decided on a 
case-by-case basis. On one hand, Carol has been working exclu-
sively for Southcoast for a number of years; she works forty 
hours a week; she is a participant in the employer's health insur-
ance program; and Southcoast withholds from her salary social 
security contributions and federal income taxes. These facts sug-
gest that Carol is an employee. On the other hand, Carol is not 
classified as an employee by Southcoast. Rather, she is labeled a 
consultant or independent contractor and it is understood that 
should Southcoast not have work for Carol she would not be 
paid. Supervision of Carol's daily work at Southcoast is limited 
to an average of about two to three hours a day. Of course, if her 
work is not satisfactory, she is not paid. If a court, after consid-
ering the facts, ruled that Carol is independent contractor then 
the ADA would be' inapplicable. Moreover, if the Southcoast's 
twenty-two consultants are not classified as employees, the total 
number of employees for Southcoast is only four. With only four 
employees Carol's case would not satisfy the ADA jurisdictional 
requirement of twenty-five or more employees. If a court finds 
that Carol and the other consultants are employees, Carol would 
have standing for a cause of action under the ADA. 
89. ADA at § 3; 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2). The ADA's definition of "disability" is gen· 
erally the same as "handicap" defined in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, supra note 64, 
and interpretat.ive case law. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,740 (1991), (App. to 29 C.F.R. § 1630). 
90. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,548 (1991); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1992). 
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3. State Remedies 
Most states have statutes which protect handicapped per-
sons from disability-based discrimination and assure access to 
public accommodations.91 In California the Fair Employment 
and Housing Act (FEHA) makes it unlawful for an employer to 
bar or discharge a person from employment or discriminate 
against a person because of his or her physical handicap or 
mental condition.92 In Raytheon Co. v. California Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Commission the court held that a person di-
agnosed with AIDS is handicapped within the meaning of the 
FEHA.93 Moreover, the Raytheon court held that section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act did not preempt the state's disability 
statute, FEHA, because both had the same purpose. In so hold-
ing the Raytheon court noted that Congress did not expressly 
preempt state disability statutes and the FEHA provided 
greater benefits that the relief under section 504. 
However, the FEHA only applies to employers of five or 
more employees. Whether Carol can use the FEHA remedy de-
pends on whether Carol and the twenty-two consultants are de-
termined to be "employees." If the consultants are employees, 
Carol has a viable cause of action under the FEHA. On the other 
hand, if the consultants are independent contractors, the FEHA 
would not be available to Carol. 
Another possible state remedy is the common law action for 
wrongful discharge. Although a wrongful discharge action does 
not require a specified number of employees in the employer's 
work force, Carol must be an employee to bring a wrongful dis-
charge action. This is because wrongful termination actions fo-
cus on the discharge of an employee. If Carol is found to be an 
employee she would have standing to bring a wrongful discharge 
action. The success of Carol's wrongful discharge action would 
turn on the nature of her employment relationship. If Carol is 
an employee, she would be considered to have employment-at-
will because she does not have an employment contract for a 
91. See Robert P. Wasson Jr., AIDS Discrimination under Federal, State, and Lo-
cal Law After Arline, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 221, 268-71 (1987). 
92. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,900-12,995 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993). 
93. Raytheon Co. v. California Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 261 Cal. Rptr. 
197 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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specified term of years. Generally, in its pure form, employment-
at-will means that the employer can terminate the employment 
of an employee at any time for any reason. In that situation 
Carol would not be successful in a wrongful discharge action. 
However, in recent years many jurisdictions have qualified 
the absolute right of employment termination for any reason. In 
particular, California has qualified the employer's right to fire an 
at-will employee at any time when the discharge would violate 
designated "public policy" imperatives.94 For example, discharge 
of an at-will employee for reasons of race or age would violate 
important public policy mandates of non-discrimination on the 
basis of race or age. Another public policy exception is invoked 
when an employee has been discharged for revealing to the au-
thorities that the employer is violating the law, the so-called 
"whistleblower" policy.95 
If Carol were an at-will employee, there would seem to be a 
strong argument that firing her because she is HIV infected 
would violate an important public policy mandate against disa-
bility discrimination. The evidence of a strong public policy 
against disability discrimination can be found in the Congress's 
enactment of the ADA and various state disability and handicap 
anti-discrimination statutes, such as California's FEHA. 
The position that a public policy against discrimination can 
be found in anti-discrimination statutes is not without its critics 
and limitations. There is a line of cases holding that anti-dis-
crimination statutes can not be employed to establish a public 
policy element in the tort of wrongful discharge.96 Part of the 
reasoning behind this no-boot-strap position is the idea that the 
statutory anti-discrimination is an exclusive remedy, and creat-
ing a tort of wrongful discharge based on public policy would be 
neither necessary nor appropriate. 
94. An action for wrongful discharge would be a contract cause of action and per-
haps also a tort. In a tort action, punitive damages are recoverable. California courts 
have recognized the tort of wrongful termination in violation of fundamental public pol-
icy. See Foley v. Interactive Data, 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); see also Rojo v. Kliger, 801 
P.2d 373 (Cal. 1990); Collier v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Ct. App. 1991); 
Verduzco v. General Dynamics, 742 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Cal. 1990). 
95. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (West 1989). 
96. See, e.g., Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc. 724 F. Supp. 1185 
(M.D.N.C. 1989). 
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However, this analysis in the instant situation ignores that 
some statutory declarations are much broader than the remedies 
afforded in the statute. For example, the ADA contains sweeping 
language of a basic public policy against disabilities discrimina-
tion. Yet under the employment title there is only a remedy for 
those in a work force of more than twenty-five employees. It 
would seem to be a strong argument that to give meaning to the 
broad language of public policy, the policy should be used in 
wrongful discharge cases to establish a remedy for those working 
for an employer who has less than twenty-five employees. This 
position is strengthened by the fact that the ADA provides that 
the Act does not preempt other federal statutory relief from dis-
crimination, nor does it preempt state statutory actions and 
common law remedies which provide equal or better relief. In 
short, the ADA and state anti-discrimination statutes are not ex-
clusive remedies. 
In summary, Carol's case looks like this: (a) Requiring an 
HIV test as a condition of continued employment may be in vio-
lation of the ADA's limitation on medical examinations. While 
the HIV test as a condition of employment is unlawful under 
California's HIV privacy statute, such an employment require-
ment is lawful in many other jurisdictions. There is no violation 
of confidentiality of medical information statutes. (b) Carol's job 
termination based on her HIV test would not be actionable 
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because her em-
ployer does not receive federal funding. Carol is a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability for purposes of the ADA. However, the 
ADA and California FEHA will afford a remedy only if Carol 
and the other consultants are employees. If she is an employee, 
her success on a wrongful discharge action is predicated upon a 
finding of a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. 
IV. TED: DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS 
A. TEO'S STORY 
Ted is a runner who lives in Chula Vista, California. The 
sponsors of an upcoming 10K race, in which Ted sought partici-
pation, required that all participants be tested for steroids. 
While being tested for steroids, his physician inquired whether 
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Ted wanted to be tested for HIV. Ted agreed to the test. The 
test results were negative for steroids, but positive for HIV. Dur-
ing the big race Ted fell, injuring his ankle. After the race, Ted 
attempted to make a physician's appointment, but his physician 
refused to treat Ted for his ankle injury "because of the risk of 
HIV exposure" to the doctor. The physician advised Ted to con-
tact another physician for his ankle injury and all other medical 
needs. 
Subsequently, Ted's physician became concerned about the 
risk Ted posed to others. Because of their physician-patient re-
lationship over the years, the physician had become familiar 
with certain details of Ted's life and family situation. Given his 
knowledge, Ted's physician decided to warn three individuals of 
their possible HIV exposure through Ted. The physician con-
tacted Ted's wife, Carol, and advised her that she had been ex-
posed to HIV infection. Surprised and dismayed, Carol became 
quite upset. The physician warned Carol that she should be 
tested for HIV to determine if she had been infected. Although 
the physician did not disclose Ted's name, Carol exclaimed: "Oh 
my God, Ted must be the infected carrier." 
The physician, knowing that Ted and Alice had been sexu-
ally intimate, contacted Alice with the news that she had been 
exposed sexually to an HIV carrier. The physician warned Alice 
that she should seek an HIV test and be careful in sexual rela-
tions with others. Ted's physician knew that Ted had a drug 
abuse problem several years ago. The physician remembered 
that Bob and Ted had engaged in intravenous drug use possibly 
using the same needle. Ted's physician notified Bob that he had 
been exposed to HIV through intravenous drug use and that he 
should be tested for HIV. 
In seeking reimbursement from his employer's health insur-
ance program, Ted submitted the necessary claim forms and 
consented to his physician verifying the medical services ren-
dered. Ted's physician submitted the requested verification in-
formation to Ted's employer, including an unrequested copy of 
the steroid and HIV test results. The employer's insurance ad-
ministrator, upon receiving this information, exclaimed in front 
of the employer that poor Ted had HIV disease. After consider-
ing the potential economic impact in treating an AIDS patient, 
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Ted's employer notified all employees that, effective immedi-
ately, the employer health insurance benefits would be limited 
for HIV and AIDS expenditures to a lifetime cap of $5,000. 
There had been no limit on reimbursement for other health 
conditions. 
Ted's scenario presents three important issues: the first is 
refusal of medical treatment; the second is the physician's dis-
closures to Carol, Alice and Bob; and the third is the employer's 
cap on medical insurance benefits for HIV disease and AIDS. 
B. PHYSICIAN REFUSAL OF TREATMENT 
Is there a legal remedy for a physician's refusal to treat? 
More broadly, the question is whether there is a legal remedy for 
denial of goods and services by privately owned businesses. Such 
a denial of services on the basis of disability is known as dis-
crimination in public accommodations, that is, services offered 
to the public. Public accommodations discrimination is quite 
different from employment discrimination. 
For quite some time the law has imposed on physicians no 
duty to treat.97 Thus physicians have been free to provide ser-
vices on a selective basis. There are some exceptions to the no-
duty-to-treat rule. A primary exception to the no-duty rule is 
the doctrine of abandonment.98 Under the abandonment doc-
trine a physician is not at liberty to stop treatment once· there 
has been an undertaking of care. To do so without an appropri-
ate referral would subject the physician to tort liability. The 
abandonment doctrine would not be useful to Ted because the 
physician had not undertaken treatment for the ankle injury, 
notwithstanding that the physician had treated Ted for a num-
ber of years.99 
However, Congress has now created a significant statutory 
exception to the no-duty-to-treat rule. By virtue of the 1990 en-
actment of the ADA it is illegal to discriminate on the basis of 
disability in public accommodations, that is, in the provision of 
97. Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901). 
98. See Clanton v. Von Haam, 340 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). 
99. See Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103 (Va. 1977). 
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goods and services to the public by private businesses; private 
business include physician offices. loo Thus the physician would 
be liable under the ADA to Ted for refusing to treat Ted's ankle 
injury based on Ted's HIV infection. 
It should be noted that under the ADA the physician is not 
required to treat Ted for HIV infection or cancer if such treat-
ment is outside the physician's specialty and area of practice. lol 
The ADA does not require doctors to treat persons with disabili-
ties for any and all aliments. Rather, the physician's obligation 
is to treat disabled people for conditions within the physician's 
practice and specialty. The ADA does not require that a physi-
cian change the nature of his or her medical practice, provided 
he or she does not discriminate on the basis of disability in pro-
viding his or her typical services. Accordingly, Ted has legal re-
dress against the physician if basic treatment for an ankle is 
within the physician's general practice. 
The Rehabilitation Act would not be useful to Ted unless 
Ted's physician takes the Medicare and Medicaid reimburse-
ment. It should be remembered that the jurisdictional require-
ment for actions under the Rehabilitation Act is that the dis-
criminating entity receives federal funding. If Ted's physician 
accepts Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement, then the physi-
cian's business is an entity receiving federal money, providing 
jurisdiction for a handicap discrimination action under the Re-
habilitation Act. 
C. PHYSICIAN DISCLOSURE OF HIV INFECTION 
The next significant issue presented by Ted's scenario is 
whether the physician is lawfully entitled to contact Bob, Carol, 
and Alice regarding their possible exposure. The warnings made 
by the physician would appear to be lawful because they have 
statutory authorization and because they do not explicitly vio-
late the right to privacy. It is, however, necessary to distinguish 
these discretionary warnings from the so-called duty-to-warn 
doctrine. l02 
100. ADA § 301(2), (6)-(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12,181(7) (Supp. III 1991). 
101. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,565 (1991); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a)-(b) (1992). 
102. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
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Among the qualifications to California's prohibition against 
identifying HIV test subjects is an express authorization for 
physicians to disclose "to a person reasonably believed to be the 
spouse ... , sexual partner or person with whom the patient has 
shared the use of hypodermic needles ... " their possible expo-
sure to HIV.lo3 This authorization does not permit name identi-
fication of the infected person. Moreover, the authorization is 
discretionary, not mandatory. Accordingly, a physician does not 
have a duty to warn sex and needle partners. 
Similarly, the physician's warnings do not violate confiden-
tiality of medical information statutes. California's Confidential-
ity of Medical Information Act prohibits unauthorized disclo-
sures of a person's medical information. l04 There is no violation 
of the Act where statutes authorize certain disclosures. Because 
Ted's physician, following the guide of section 199.25(a), did not 
identify the infected person by name or otherwise, there is no 
breach of confidentiality under the Act. 
The physician's warnings of possible HIV infection invoke 
an inquiry concerning the right of privacy. As noted, the Califor-
nia Constitution explicitly guarantees a right of privacy. 1011 The 
Urbaniak decision found a privacy violation when a health care 
worker made an unauthorized disclosure of a named individual's 
HIV status. loe However, under the facts of Ted's case, there is 
no invasion of privacy because the infected individual was not 
ideritified by name even though Ted was easily identifiable by 
the warnings. Moreover, there is a paramount state interest in 
encouraging warnings of the kind given here, in order to en-
courage early medical intervention and prevention of infection. 
D. INSURANCE LIMITS ON HIV DISEASE 
1. Release of HIV Test to Employer 
The facts in Ted's scenario also present another problem. 
The physician, in complying with the insurance reimbursement 
forms, included a copy of Ted's HIV test. Because Ted's em-
103. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.25(a) (West 1990). 
104. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.13 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). 
105. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
106. Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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ployer is self-insured, the information went to the employer. 
Upon learning Ted had HIV, the employer revised the company 
health insurance program to put a lifetime cap on expenses for 
HIV disease. Previously there had been no lifetime caps on any 
medical expenses for any condition. After the employer modified 
the plan, there still were no caps on any other medical condition 
except HIV. The problem here has two aspects: first, was the 
HIV disclosure to the employer lawful; second, was it lawful for 
the self-insured employer to put an insurance reimbursement 
cap exclusively on HIV disease expenditures. As to the first is-
sue, two arguments may be made by the physician: one, the in-
surance company required the disclosure, and two, Ted 
consented. 
It is an appealing argument that while it was appropriate 
for Ted's physician to verify his medical services for purposes of 
reimbursement, the physician is liable for negligently or inten-
tionally disclosing Ted's HIV test result. While the physician 
must of course advise the insurer of provided services (office 
visit, lab expenses, etc.), it is questionable whether it was appro-
priate for him to include the HIV test result. Certification of the 
fact that the physician performed the test and had lab expenses 
would seem to be sufficient to satisfy insurance purposes. This 
argument is bolstered by California Health and Safety Code sec-
tions 199.20 to 199.27, which clearly prohibit disclosure of HIV 
test results except in certain express circumstances. Disclosure 
to employers is not one of these statutory exceptions. Indeed, 
section 199.21(f) expressly bars the use of HIV tests for employ-
ment purposes. 
It might be argued that Ted's consent to release medical in-
formation for insurance purposes would include consent to re-
lease the results of any lab test. The decisive point is whether 
the results of the lab test were necessary for insurance reim-
bursement purposes. If not, it is likely that the physician vio-
lated section 199 and the Confidentiality of Medical Information 
Act. Moreover, implied consent, oral consent, or a sighed general 
consent are insufficient under section 199, which requires signed 
written consent of a test subject to release an HIV test result. 
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2. Employer Cap on HIV Benefits 
The other troubling issue raised by Ted's case is whether 
the employer can legally cap reimbursement for HIV disease ex-
penditures, while placing no limit on expenses for other condi-
tions. Initially this selection might seem to be discriminatory. 
However, some federal courts, with the implied blessing of the 
Supreme Court,107 have ruled that the Employee Retirement In-
surance Security Act (ERISA) preempts state insurance laws in 
the regulation of self-insured employer benefit programs. lOS 
Thus employer self-insured health plans are not subject to state 
laws which often mandate insurance coverage. This was the 
holding of McGann v. H & H Music Co., which further held that 
in regulation of self-insured health insurance programs, ERISA 
does not prohibit an employer cap on coverage for HIV or AIDS 
benefits. los 
In that case, McGann, an employee of H & H Music, was 
diagnosed with AIDS and submitted medical expense claims for 
reimbursement under the employer medical plan. At that time 
the plan had a lifetime expense limit of one million dollars for 
all diseases. Shortly thereafter H & H notified all employees of 
changes in the medical plan. The employer medical plan became 
self-insured, bringing it under ERISA's jurisdiction, and it re-
duced maximum medical benefits payable to any employee for 
AIDS to $5000. 
Thereafter McGann sued H & H under section 510 of 
ERISA which makes it unlawful to retaliate against a employee 
benefit plan participant for "exercising any right to which he is 
entitled."llo McGann contended that the provision limiting cov-
107. The U.S. Supreme Court denied review of the circuit court's decision in Mc-
Gann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 
(1992). 
108. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
109. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991). 
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). 
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, 
suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a par-
ticipant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which 
he is entitled under the provisions of an employee bene-
fit plan ... or for the purpose of interfering with the 
attainment of any right to which such participant may 
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erage for AIDS-related expenses was directed specifically at him 
in retaliation for exercising his rights under the medical plan. 
The court found against McGann holding that he was not de-
nied any right to which he was entitled. The court found that 
there was nothing to indicate H & H ever promised that the 
$1,000,000 coverage was permanent. "Defendants [H & H] broke 
no promise to McGann. The continued availability of the 
$1,000,000 limit was not a right .... "lll The court found that to 
hold otherwise would mean an employer "could not effectively 
reserve the right to amend a medical plan to reduce benefits 
"112 
The court in H & H Music went on to hold that "ERISA 
does not broadly prevent an employer from 'discriminating' in 
the creation, alteration or termination of employee benefits 
plans." ERISA "does not prohibit welfare plan discrimination 
between or among categories of diseases." Moreover, the court 
concluded that ERISA "does not prohibit an employer from 
electing not to cover or to continue to cover AIDS, while cover-
ing or continuing to cover other catastrophic illnesses, even 
though the employer's decision in this respect may stem from 
some 'prejudice' against AIDS or its victims generally."1l3 
However, H & H Music was decided before the effective 
date of the ADA. The ADA generally makes it illegal to discrimi-
·nate based on disaQility. An employer cap on expenses for HIV 
disease, but no other medical condition, is discrimination based 
on a particular disability. Accordingly there is a forceful argu-
ment that the ADA would prohibit this kind of disability-based 
discrimination. 
Insurers and employers assert that insurance matters are to-
tally excluded from ADA coverage.1l4 This theory is premised on 
the language in section 501 of the ADA: this "Act shall not be 
construed to prohibit or restrict. . . an insurer. . . from under-
writing risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that 
become entitled under the plan . . . . 
111. McGann, 946 F.2d at 405. 
112. [d. 
113. [d. at 408. 
114. See, e.g., Doe v. SCHIP, DC SC Columbia Div, No. 3:93-0674-21, (April 4, 
1993). 
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are based on or not inconsistent with State law .... "llI! The po-
sition that insurance is totally exempt from the ADA is some-
what diminished by further language in section 202: the above 
language about insurance "shall not be used as a subterfuge to 
evade the purposes . . . " of the ADA. The regulations imple-
menting the ADA also provide: "an employer ... cannot deny a 
qualified individual with a disability equal access to insurance or 
subject a qualified individual with a disability to different terms 
or conditions of insurance based on disability alone .... "118 
To suggest that the first part of section 202 is a total ex-
emption of insurance from the ADA is an unjustified and overly 
broad interpretation exceeding the language of section 202 and 
is inconsistent with the purposes of the ADA. The critical ques-
tion, which will have to await court interpretation, is whether 
selecting certain disabilities for coverage exclusion or limitation 
is "underwriting risks, classifying risks or administering such 
risks .... " It may plausibly be argued that disability-based cov-
erage exclusions and reimbursement caps are outside the mean-
ing of "underwriting risks." Thus it is debatable whether it was 
lawful for Ted's employer to cap benefits for HIV disease. This 
issue remains an open question.117 
In summary of Ted's situation, the physician's refusal to 
treat Ted's ankle injury merely because of Ted's HIV infection 
is a disability-based discrimination in violation of the ADA, pro-
vided the physician's practice includes ankle injuries. The physi-
cian's disclosures, or warnings of possible HIV exposure, to 
Ted's sex and needle partners does not violate the California 
Health and Safety Code sections 199.20 to 199.27 because Ted 
was not identified as the HIV carrier. Because Ted's identity 
was not made known, he appears to have no cause of action for 
violation of his right to privacy, nor for a violation of confidenti-
ality of medical information statutes. The physician's disclosure 
of Ted's HIV test result to Ted's employer was unlawful. 
Whether it was legal for the employer's to put a cap on HIV 
benefits depends on how the courts interpret the insurance pro-
visions of the ADA. 
115. 42 u.s.c. § 12,201(c) (Supp. III 1991). 
116. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,725, 35,753 (1991) (App. to 29 C.F.R. § 1630). 
117. See Owens v. Storehouse, 984 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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V. ALICE: HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 
A. ALICE'S STORY 
345 
Alice is a person with HIV infection. She has resided for 
several years in her apartment. One day in a casual conversation 
Alice's landlord, having noticed frequent deliveries by a local 
pharmacy, inquired about Alice's health. Alice confided in the 
landlord that she had HIV disease, but was not seriously ill at 
the present time. The landlord pondered the news of Alice's dis-
ease and its possible impact on present and future tenants. Fear-
ing a negative reaction by the other tenants, the landlord gave 
Alice an eviction notice which complied with the terms of their 
month-to-month lease. 
Alice became quite upset about losing her apartment. She 
was put into contact with the owner of a very large house who 
was planning to convert it into a "group house" for ambulatory 
people with HIV disease. Several neighbors of the prospective 
group house were greatly concerned about living near an AIDS 
shelter. After hearing the neighbors' complaint, the City Zoning 
Board refused to issue a special use permit for the group home. 
The legal issues presented by Alice's scenario are two: First, 
does Alice have any legal remedy against her landlord for her 
eviction based on her HIV infection, even though the eviction 
otherwise complied with the terms of their lease? Second, does 
the owner of the prospective group house have any legal remedy 
against the City Zoning Board for denial of the special use 
permit? 
B. HIV-BASED HOUSING EVICTION 
Relief for housing eviction based on disability would be 
available under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 
(FHAA) and perhaps under state housing laws prohibiting hand-
icap discrimination. The ADA would not help Alice because it 
does not cover housing discrimination. The Rehabilitation Act 
would be an unlikely recourse because the landlord does not re-
ceive federal funding. 
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, popularly known 
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as the Fair Housing Act, was enacted to prohibit racial segrega-
tion in housing. lls In 1988 the Fair Housing Amendments Act 
(FHAA) was enacted, amending the law to extend the principle 
of equal housing opportunity to people with handicaps.ll9 Essen-
tially the FHAA made it unlawful for public and private entities 
to discriminate against people with handicaps in the sale, rental, 
or advertising of dwellings, in the provision of brokerage ser-
vices, and in residential real estate transactions. 12o The primary 
purposes of the FHAA are to end segregation of housing for peo-
ple with disabilities, to increase housing choices for people with 
disabilities, and to require reasonable accommodations by land-
lords, thus allowing the disabled full enjoyment of appropriate 
housing. 
An aggrieved party under the FHAA may seek court relief 
in a private civil action for injunctive relief, damages and penal-
ties, and attorney fees for the successful party. In addition to 
private court action, the aggrieved party may seek administra-
tive relief with Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD).l2l The Act does not require the exhaustion of adminis-
trative relief before filing a private lawsuit in court. Administra-
tive relief would, however, be less costly and easier. 
The FHAA defines "handicap" as that term is used in sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and its interpretative regula-
tions. "Handicap" means: (1) physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major 
life activities; (2) a record of having such an impairment; or (3) 
being regarded as having such an impairment.122 The FHAA's 
protection of people with a handicap extends to people with 
AIDS, HIV infection, and those perceived to have HIV infection 
whether or not they are in fact infected.123 
The obligation to provide housing to people with a handi-
118. Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
119. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619-1636 (1988), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 
& Supp. III 1991). . 
120. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. at 1620-23, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06. 
121. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 8, 102 Stat. at 1633, 42 U.S.C. § 3613. 
122. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 5(b), 102 Stat. at 1619, 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). 
123. The HUD regulations added "human immunodeficiency virus infection" to the 
list of illustrations of "physical or mental impairments" in its definition of handicap. 24 
C.F.R. § 100.201; 54 Fed. Reg. 3232,3288 (1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 101.201 (1992). 
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cap, and the obligation to make reasonable accommodations in 
dwellings, is limited by a "direct threat" exception. The Act 
does not require that a "dwelling be made available to an indi-
vidual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the 
health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would re-
sult in substantial physical damage to the property of others."I24 
The landlord has the burden of showing, through direct and ob-
jective evidence of overt acts, that the tenancy poses a direct 
threat. Generalized assumptions, subjective fears, and specula-
tion are insufficient to prove the requisite direct threat to others. 
The direct threat exception is not available if the discrimination 
is based on stereotypes, ignorance, perceptions about disabilities 
and unfounded speculation. 
Accordingly, the FHAA would be a successful remedy for 
Alice against her landlord for her eviction, because the eviction 
was based on possible negative reactions by tenants to Alice's 
HIV infection. The baseless fears of the tenants and landlord 
that Alice's tenancy presents a safety risk cannot be used to in-
voke the direct threat exception. 
C. DISCRIMINATORY ZONING PRACTICES 
The second issue presented by Alice's scenario is whether 
there is a legal remedy against the zoning board for the denial of 
a special use permit for a group house for people with HIV in-
fection. The FHAA not only provides a cause of action by an 
aggrieved handicapped person, it also confers standing to bring a 
cause of action against individuals or entities which provide 
housing for people with handicaps.1211 The FHAA prohibits state 
and local health, safety, land use, and zoning regulations that 
exclude people with handicaps or restrict them from living in 
group homes and other congregate living arrangements. Neigh-
bors' prejudices, unjustified fears, and negative attitudes about 
people with handicaps may not be invoked as a basis to restrict 
the housing choices and opportunities of people with 
disabilities.126 
124. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(a), 102 Stat. at 1622 (42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(9». 
125. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. at 1620, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(1). 
126. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3285 (1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c){l) (1992». 
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According to the HUD regulations, the FHAA's definition of 
"aggrieved person," one who is entitled to bring a claim under 
the Act, includes advocacy organizations and providers of hous-
ing for people with disabilities in addition to the handicapped 
consumerP7 Such organizations and providers need not be 
handicapped themselves. Thus, under the facts of Alice's case, 
the owner of the prospective group house for people with HIV 
infection is an "aggrieved person" with a right to bring an action 
under the FHAA even though the owner is not handicapped. 
A case in point is Baxter v. City of Belleville. 128 Charles 
Baxter sought to open "Our Place," a group home for HIV in-
fected persons in Belleville, Illinois. After learning of Baxter's 
intentions, the Belleville Zoning Board refused to issue him a 
special use permit for the group house. Baxter then filed suit for 
injunctive relief and damages under the FHAA. 
The court held that HIV infected persons are handicapped 
within the meaning of the FHAA. The court found that the 
group house, "Our Place," would not constitute a direct threat 
to the health or safety of others. Finally, the court held that the 
actions of the City of Belleville were based at least in part on 
handicap discrimination.129 Accordingly, the court issued a pre-
liminary injunction forbidding the City of Belleville from refus-
ing to issue a special use permit to Baxter. 
As to Alice's case, the FHAA would most likely provide a 
successful remedy for the special use permit for a group house 
for HIV infected persons. Similarly, California disability statutes 
would provide a remedy for Alice's eviction and the denial of the 
special use permit. Because the city which denied the special use 
permit receives federal funding, Alice would also have a cause of 
action under the Rehabilitation Act. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Returning to the opening theme of this article, there are 
several remedies for disability discrimination depending on sev-
127. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3238 (Jan. 1989). 
128. 720 F. Supp. 720, 729 (S.D. III. 1989). 
129. Id. at 733. 
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eral factors. Whether the various legal remedies will prove use-
ful, however, depends on circumstances at the time and place of 
the alleged discriminatory act. Generally, the disability claimant 
must prove that there is jurisdictional inclusion, that plaintiff is 
covered and qualified, that the discriminating entity is a covered 
entity, and that the elements necessary for proving discrimina-
tion are present. This burden is no small matter. For example, if 
the claimant seeks a claim under section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, claimant must prove that defendant is receiving federal 
funds. Likewise, for the ADA employment provisions to apply, 
there must be twenty-five or more employees. ISO For the Califor-
nia FEHA to have jurisdiction, there must be five or more em-
ployees. For state and local coverage, there is the necessary 
boundary jurisdictional issue. 
In selecting the appropriate and available cause of action, 
consideration should be given to whether an action affords an 
administrative enforcement, as opposed to an exclusive remedy 
of bringing a private lawsuit. Most statutory causes provide for 
administrative enforcement, while the common law tort and con-
tract actions do not afford administrative relief. A benefit to the 
administrative recourse is cost and time. An administrative 
claim will set in motion an investigation conducted by the ad-
ministrative agency. This represents a considerable cost saving 
because the claimant does not have to pay initial discovery costs 
associated with a private lawsuit. Too, because the administra-
tive forum is less formal than a trial, there is usually a great 
saving in time. Moreover, an attorney is not required for admin-
istrative enforcement. 
Given the fact that many people with disabilities have a 
short life expectancy, time is of the essence. In Raytheon Co. u. 
California Fair Employment & Housing Commission, the claim-
ant Chadbourne died before the appellate court had reached its 
decision. lSI The same is true in many other HIV cases, including 
McGann u. H & H Music Co. Thus the time saving factor looms 
large as an advantage to administrative relief. 
130. After July 26, 1994, any employer who has fifteen or more employees will be 
covered. ADA § 101(5), 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5) (Supp. III 1991). 
131. See Raytheon Co. v. California Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 261 Cal. 
Rptr. 197, 199 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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Of course, there may be a requirement that the claimant has 
fully exhausted administrative relief before seeking judicial re-
lief. For example, issuance of a right-to-sue letter by the EEOC 
is a prerequisite to seeking judicial relief for an ADA claim 
under Title I. However, an action under the ADA public services 
title (Title II) does not require administrative exhaustion before 
seeking judicial relief. 132 
One challenge to a discrimination claim is that the statute 
or cause of action under which relief is sought has been pre-
empted by a superior law. For example, if a claimant presses a 
claim under a state statute, such as the FEHA, the defense 
might assert that federal legislation preempts the state claim. 
Likewise, it might be argued that local anti-discrimination ordi-
nances are preempted by state statutes covering the same sub-
ject. However, many decisions have ruled that state FEHA relief 
is not preempted by federal legislation.133 In addition, Congress, 
with the enactment of the ADA, did not intend to displace any 
of the rights or remedies provided by other federal laws or other 
state or local laws, including state common law actions, that pro-
vide greater or equal protection to individuals with disabili-
ties. 134 If a state tort claim confers greater remedies, it is not 
preempted by the ADA. 
Another important factor in deciding which relief to pursue 
depends on what remedies are available. Traditionally, under 
the Rehabilitation Act, section 504, the remedy is equitable re-
lief including back pay, but no punitive damages. 131i However, 
under the ADA Title I, employment discrimination, the claim-
ant may seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, and a 
jury trial. ls6 Whereas an action under Title III, public services 
by private entities, affords only compensatory damages, fines 
and no jury trial right. ls7 
132. ADA § 203, 42 U.S.C. § 12,133 (Supp. III 1991). 
133. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. California Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 261 
Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ct. App. 1989). 
134. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,546 (1991). 
135. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 (1984). 
136. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. III 1991). 
137. The remedies and procedures for violations of Title III are the same as those 
set forth in Section 204(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ADA § 308(a), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12,188(a) (Supp. III 1991); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 205(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) 
(1988). 
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There are some unresolved issues which need to be ad-
dressed in order to improve redress for disability-based discrimi-
nation. For example, singling out a particular disability for lim-
ited insurance coverage as occurred in McGann l38 resulted in no 
meaningful coverage for the catastrophic illness AIDS. This rul-
ing will encourage cost conscious employers to self-insure and 
'limit expense coverage for catastrophic diseases such as cancer 
or heart problems. Obviously if an employer can eliminate costs 
for expensive health conditions they can significantly reduce 
their health care costs. As this cost burden is removed from pri-
vate insurance and employers, it is shifted to the insured em-
ployee as direct out-of-pocket and to public insurance reim-
bursement systems for the financially needy. This is an 
unfortunate shift in cost burdens. Many ill people will not be 
able financially to pay for the enormous costs associated with 
catastrophic illnesses. Their only hope is that some government 
insurance, such as Medicare or Medicaid, will provide coverage. 
This cost shift from private insurance to public insurance 
defeats the very purpose of insurance, and puts the cost on those 
least able to pay for it. 
It may be that some court will reverse the trend of McGann 
and find that ERISA section 510 prohibits disability discrimina-
tion in self-insured plans. There is also hope that the newly ef-
fective ADA will be found to ban the kind of discrimination 
presently allowed under the holding of McGann v. H & H Mu-
sic. Another avenue to address this unfortunate holding is for 
Congress to amend ERISA so as to expressly prohibit the disa-
bility-based discrimination permitted in McGann.139 Of course, 
there will be difficulty in passage of such a proposal as self-in-
sured employers lobby for the continuation of the McGann 
holding as a cost saving benefit. 
Related to the problem created by McGann, is the broader 
issue of whether the ADA applies to the insurance industry. The 
statutory root to this confusion is the ADA provision that the 
ADA does not interfere with insurance risk rating. If the pur-
pose of the ADA is to be fulfilled this provision cannot be al-
lowed to free the entire insurance industry from the require-
138. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991). 
139. See McGann, 946 F.2d at 405. 
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ments of the ADA. 
Another problem at the state levei is the dubious position 
that a compulsory HIV test is authorized if there is contact of an 
arrestee's bodily fluids with the skin of the arresting officer. It is 
bad medicine and bad law. It is possible that another court may 
rule that compulsory testing is legal only if there were a substan-
tial risk of HIV transmission. Absent such judicial redress, the 
Legislature should enact reconstructive language to the same ef-
fect. Passage of such proposed legislation may be difficult given 
the position of the police officers' lobby seeking to broaden the 
occasion for compulsory HIV testing. 
Police and employer lobbies are urging positions which con-
flict with the goal of prohibiting disability discrimination; this 
underscores the difficulty of removing unnecessary barriers to 
equal and fair treatment regardless of disability. Many who 
lobby against freedom from unnecessary disability discrimina-
tion do so because of financial considerations, prejudice, and ig-
norance. These motivating factors are legally insufficient. The 
goal of legislation prohibiting disability-based discrimination is 
to protect persons with disabilities for deprivations based on 
prejudice, stereotypes, unfounded fear, ignorance.14o It would be 
a pernicious idea that discrimination cannot be justified by prej-
udicial attitudes, but can be justified if the motivation is cost 
avoidance. Indeed, if cost savings is an excuse to justify discrimi-
nation, it would mean that the anti-discrimination legislation 
has been dealt a fatal blow.l4l 
One final point is of broader implication. The purpose of 
anti-discrimination legislation is to avoid deprivations prompted 
by pernicious mythologies or irrational fear. In supporting such 
legislation and its goals, society improves the chance of avoiding 
discrimination against any individual regardless of their group 
identification. Freedom for all can be guaranteed only if society 
140. See Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 1988); 
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
141. The cost of alterations by an employer which are necessary for accommodating 
an employee disability is a factor in determining whether the accommodations are rea-
sonable and must be made. However, using cost in figuring whether an accommodation is 
reasonable is quite different from a position that discrimination is justified by cost sav-
ings generally. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,752 (1991). 
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protects against unnecessary and unjustified discrimination 
against any person or group. 
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APPENDIX 
A REMEDIES CHECKLIST 
A. CONFIDENTIALITY: STATE REMEDIES 
1. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, PRIVACY RIGHT, ART. 1, § 1. 
Prohibits invasion of privacy by state or private parties. Remedy 
is private lawsuit for damages. 
2. CALIFORNIA CONFIDENTIALITY MEDICAL INFORMATION ACT, CIVIL 
CODE §§ 56-56.13. 
Prohibits unauthorized disclosures of medical information. Com-
pensatory and punitive damages are available. 
3. CALIFORNIA PRIVACY OF AIDS/HIV TEST ACT, HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE §§ 199.20 -.27. 
Prohibits disclosures of AIDS/HIV test results and use of AIDS/ 
HIV test for purposes of insurability or employment. Violators 
subject to actual damages, fine ($1000 to $10,000), and possible 
jail time. 
4. COMMON LAW ACTIONS: 
A) INVASION OF PRIVACY. Private suit is available for compensa-
tory and punitive damages. 
B) DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY. Duty is owed by physician to his/ 
her patients regarding medical information. Private suit is avail-
able for compensatory and punitive damages. 
5. LOCAL GOVERNMENT REMEDIES: 
A) COUNTY AIDS/HIV TEST PRIVACY ORDINANCE. 
B) CITY AIDS/HIV TEST PRIVACY ORDINANCE. 
B. CONFIDENTIALITY: FEDERAL REMEDIES 
1. U.S. CONSTITUTION AMEND. IV: Freedom from Unreasonable 
Search. 
2. U.S. CONSTITUTION: Right to Privacy. 
3. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, TIT. I, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12,112(c). 
Prohibits disability inquiries of job applicants and pre-offer of 
employment medical exam. Administrative remedy or private 
suit is available for equitable relief and damages. 
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C. DISCRIMINATION: STATE REMEDIES 
1. CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING ACT (FEHA), GOVT. 
CODE § 12,940(A).Prohibits disability-based discrimination 
against qualified handicapped employee. Administrative enforce-
ment and/or private suit is available for equitable relief and 
damages. 
2. CALIFORNIA HANDICAPPED ACCESS IN PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS, 
CIVIL CODE § 54.1. Prohibits handicapped-based discrimination 
in access to public accommodations. 
3. COMMON LAW ACTIONS: 
A) CONTRACT: WRONGFUL DISCHARGE. 
Provides action for damages resulting from job discharge before 
term specified or discharge in violation of public policy. 
B) TORT: DEFAMATION. 
False accusation of AIDS may result in employees' damages re-
covery against employer for slander. Also employer is liable in 
damages for defamation resulting from employees' compelled 
self-publications. 
c) TORT: EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
Provides action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
because of abusive conduct by employer, supervisors or co-work-
ers. Recovery is in damages for intentional actions deemed to be 
so outrageous as to exceed all bounds of decency. 
4. LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROTECTIONS. 
County and city ordinances may protect against AIDS-based or 
disability-based discrimination in employment, public access 
and housing. Remedies vary but often allow administrative relief 
or private suit for damages. 
D. DISCRIMINATION: FEDERAL REMEDIES 
1. REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.c. § 794. 
Prohibits entities receiving federal funds from discrimination 
against qualified, handicapped individuals. Allows equitable re-
lief, damages, attorney fees, and/or termination of federal 
funding. 
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2. FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT (1989), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3619. 
Prohibits discrimination based on handicap in sale, rental, re-
lated businesses, and zoning. Administrative relief is available 
through HUD and/or private suit for equitable relief, fines, ac-
tual and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. 
3. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12,101-12,213. 
Prohibits discrimination against qualified individual in employ-
ment, public or private services, and transportation. Allows eq-
uitable relief, damages, and attorneys' fees. Jury trial and puni-
tive damages available for intentional discrimination in 
employment. 
4. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Protects against denial of constitutional rights such as a state 
officer's violation of person's right to privacy. Allows equitable 
relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. 
5. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INSURANCE SECURITY ACT (ERISA), 
§§ 502(A), 510, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(A), 1140. 
Prohibits discharge of employee to avoid health insurance costs. 
Administrative enforcement is available through the Depart-
ment of Labor and suit by "participants" in employment benefit 
plan. 
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